The Supreme Court/The Supreme Court.iso/pc/ascii/1991/91_1010/91_1010.zd

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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 91-1010
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PUERTO RICO AQUEDUCT AND SEWER AUTHOR-
ITY, PETITIONER v. METCALF & EDDY, INC.
on writ of certiorari to the united states court
of appeals for the first circuit
[January 12, 1993]

  Justice Stevens, dissenting.
  This case arises out of a commercial dispute between
respondent, a private engineering firm, and the Puerto
Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority (PRASA or Authority).
The parties entered into a multimillion dollar contract
providing for the construction of extensive improvements
to Puerto Rico's wastewater treatment facilities.  Respon-
dent brought suit in the Federal District Court for the
District of Puerto Rico alleging breach of contract.  The
Authority filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the
action was barred by the Eleventh Amendment.  The
District Court concluded that the claim had no merit and
denied the motion to dismiss.  The Court of Appeals
dismissed PRASA's appeal from that order because it was
not final within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. 1291.
  If the Authority were a private litigant engaged in a
commercial dispute, it would be perfectly clear that the
dismissal of its appeal was required by our precedents.
For the denial of a motion to dismiss on jurisdictional
grounds-a motion that asserts that the defendant cannot
be sued in a particular forum-is not a final order within
the meaning of 1291.  Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486
U. S. 517, 526-527 (1988); Catlin v. United States, 324
U. S. 229, 236 (1945).  In this case, PRASA makes the
same assertion-namely, that it may not be sued in a
federal forum but rather must be sued in another court.
Brief for Petitioner 4-5.
  Nonetheless, despite our decisions in Biard and Catlin,
the Court holds that when a State or state entity claiming
to be an -arm of the State- asserts that it cannot be sued
in a federal forum because of the Eleventh Amendment,
the -final decision- rule must give way and the claim
must be subject to immediate appellate review.  The Court
reasons that such a claim is analogous to a government
official's claim of absolute or qualified immunity, which we
have held is subject to interlocutory appeal.  Nixon v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 731 (1982); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472
U. S. 511 (1985).  I cannot agree.
  The defense of absolute or qualified immunity is de-
signed to shield government officials from liability for
their official conduct.  In the absence of such a defense,
we have held, -officials would hesitate to exercise their
discretion in a way injuriously affecting the claims of
particular individuals even when the public interest
required bold and unhesitating action.-  Nixon v. Fitzger-
ald, 457 U. S., at 744-745 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).  Because the specter of a long and
contentious legal proceeding in and of itself would inhibit
government officials from exercising their authority with
the freedom and independence necessary to serve the
public interest, we have held that claims of absolute or
qualified immunity are subject to immediate appeal.  Id.,
at 742-743; Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U. S., at 526-527.
  While the Eleventh Amendment defense available to
States and state entities is often labeled an -immunity,-
that label is virtually all that it has in common with the
defense of absolute or qualified immunity.  In contrast to
the latter, a defense based on the Eleventh Amendment,
even when the Amendment is read at its broadest, does
not contend that the State or state entity is shielded from
liability for its conduct, but only that the federal courts
are without jurisdiction over claims against the State or
state entity.  See ante, at 4.  Nothing in the Eleventh
Amendment bars respondent from seeking recovery in a
different forum.  Indeed, as noted above, petitioner
acknowledges that it is not seeking immunity for its
conduct, but merely that the suit be brought in the courts
of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.  Brief for Petitioner
4-5.
  Plainly, then, the interests underlying our decisions
allowing immediate appeal of claims of absolute or quali-
fied immunity do not apply when the so-called -immunity-
is one based on the Eleventh Amendment.  Whether
petitioner must bear the burden, expense, and distraction
of litigation stemming from its contractual dispute with
respondent has nothing whatsoever to do with the Elev-
enth Amendment; the Eleventh Amendment only deter-
mines where, or more precisely, where not, that suit may
be brought.  Because the Amendment goes to the juris-
diction of the federal court, as opposed to the underlying
liability of the State or state entity, Biard and Catlin, not
Nixon and Mitchell, are the relevant precedent for deter-
mining whether PRASA's claim is subject to interlocutory
appeal.
  If indeed the interests underlying our decisions permit-
ting immediate appeal of claims of absolute or qualified
immunity do not apply to a State or state entity's objec-
tion to federal jurisdiction on Eleventh Amendment
grounds, what then is driving the Court to hold that
PRASA's claim under the Eleventh Amendment is subject
to immediate appeal?  The Court tells us, ante, at 7:
-[The] ultimate justification is the importance of ensuring
that the State's dignitary interests can be fully vindi-
cated.-  Whereas a private litigant must suffer through
litigation in a federal tribunal despite his claim that the
court lacks jurisdiction, e.g., Biard and Catlin, a State or
state entity must be protected from the -indignity- of
having to present its case-as to both the court's jurisdic-
tion and the underlying merits-in the neutral forum of
a federal district court.
  I find that rationale to be embarrassingly insufficient.
The mandate of 1291 that appellate jurisdiction be
limited to -final decisions of the district courts- is not
predicated upon -mer[e] technical conceptions of `finality,'-
Catlin, 324 U. S., at 233, but serves important interests
concerning the fair and efficient administration of justice.
The -final decision- rule preserves the independence of the
trial judge and conserves the judicial resources that are
necessarily expended by piecemeal appeals.  Moreover, and
of particular relevance to this case, it serves an important
-fairness- purpose by preventing -the obstruction to just
claims that would come from permitting the harassment
and cost of a succession of separate appeals from the
various rulings to which a litigation may give rise . . . .-
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U. S. 368, 374
(1981) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Sacrificing those interests in the name of preserving the
freedom and independence that government officials need
to carry out their official duties is one thing; doing so out
of concern for the -dignitary- interest of a State or, in this
case, a state aqueduct and sewer authority, is quite
another.
  For me, the balance of interests is easy.  The cost to
the courts and the parties of permitting piecemeal litiga-
tion of this sort clearly outweighs whatever benefit to
their -dignity- States or state entities might derive by
having their Eleventh Amendment claims subject to
immediate appellate review.  I would therefore hold, as
did the court below, that the denial of a motion to dismiss
on Eleventh Amendment grounds is not subject to immedi-
ate appellate review.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.